![]() Malware is software created to modify a device's behavior for the benefit of a malicious third party (attacker). In fact, by owning an infrastructure device such as a router, the attacker may gain a privileged position and be able to access data flows or crypto materials or perform additional attacks against the rest of the infrastructure. While these types of attacks still represent the majority of attacks on network devices, attackers are now looking for ways to subvert the normal behavior of infrastructure devices due to the devices' privileged position within the IT infrastructure. In the past, attackers were primarily targeting infrastructure devices to create a denial of service (DoS) situation. Note: This document applies only to Cisco IOS Software and to no other Cisco operating systems. Additionally, the document presents common best practices that can help protect against attempts to modify hardware or inject malicious software (also referred to as malware) in a Cisco IOS device. This document analyzes methods that may be used to compromise Cisco devices, including the injection of malicious software in Cisco IOS Software, and describes ways to verify that the software on a Cisco router, both in device storage and in running memory, has not been modified. Use Centralized and Comprehensive Logging Use TACACS+ Authorization to Restrict Commands Use Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Leverage the Latest Cisco IOS Security Protection Features Verify MD5 Validation Feature for the Text RegionĬisco IOS Address Space Layout Randomization ConsiderationsĬhecking That Cisco IOS Software Call Stacks Are Within the Text Section BoundariesĬhecking Command History in the Cisco IOS Core Dump Verifying Authenticity for Digitally Signed ImagesĬisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification This is designed to prevent reconfiguration.Using the Message Digest 5 File Validation Feature After the boot process is complete, the hardware used to enable SCIP is locked. Writeable mappings inside its part of the protected memory regionĪlso at boot time, to configure SCIP for the Secure Enclave, the Secure Enclave operating system is used. iBoot configures each coprocessor’s memory unit to help prevent:Įxecutable mappings outside its part of the protected memory region SCIP works much like Kernel Integrity Protection (KIP): At boot time, iBoot loads each coprocessor’s firmware into a protected memory region, one that’s reserved and separate from the KIP region. To prevent modification of coprocessor firmware, Apple uses a mechanism called System Coprocessor Integrity Protection (SCIP). Therefore its security is a key part of the security of the overall system. iPhone Text Message Forwarding securityĬoprocessor firmware handles many critical system tasks-for example, the Secure Enclave, the image sensor processor, and the motion coprocessor.How iMessage sends and receives messages.Adding transit and eMoney cards to Apple Wallet.Rendering cards unusable with Apple Pay.Adding credit or debit cards to Apple Pay.How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected.Intro to app security for iOS and iPadOS.Protecting access to user’s health data.How Apple protects users’ personal data.Activating data connections securely in iOS and iPadOS.Protecting user data in the face of attack. ![]() Protecting keys in alternate boot modes.Encryption and Data Protection overview.UEFI firmware security in an Intel-based Mac.Additional macOS system security capabilities.recoveryOS and diagnostics environments.Contents of a LocalPolicy file for a Mac with Apple silicon.LocalPolicy signing-key creation and management.Boot process for iOS and iPadOS devices.Secure intent and connections to the Secure Enclave.Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords.
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